02-12-2015, 21:13 #1
- Data de Ingresso
- Jul 2012
[EN] The list of potential Yahoo buyers is already being drawn up
[EN] The list of potential Yahoo buyers is already being drawn up
The speculation about who might purchase Yahoo's struggling internet business has already begun, following a Wall Street Journal report on Tuesday that the company's board would consider a sale, among other strategic options, during meetings this week.
The obvious candidates to purchase Yahoo's internet business include telecommunications and media companies as well as private equity firms.
Verizon Wireless, which acquired AOL for $4.4 billion in June, and IAC Interactive, the online-services holding company, would both "likely explore a purchase," The Wall Street Journal said in a follow-up report on Wednesday, citing anonymous sources.
News Corp., which owns The Journal, and Time Inc. would also consider acquiring pieces of Yahoo, should they become available, The Journal noted.
While speculating, we'd add Comcast, which recently invested in Vox and Buzzfeed, and Disney, which has explored investments in Buzzfeed and Vice, according to reports.
This is all highly speculative at this point. None of these companies appear to be in talks with Yahoo about a potential deal. Yahoo's internet business is not even officially on the auction block yet.
The stock market currently values Yahoo's core internet business at less than zero, with all of the value assigned to its Asian assets, such as its 15% stake in Chinese ecommerce giant Alibaba Group.
But several analysts have recently floated their own estimates for what core Yahoo is worth.
•Pivotal Research analyst Brian Wieser values core Yahoo at $1.9 billion, not including the $5.8 billion in cash on its balance sheet.
•Cowen's John Blackledge pegs the value of Yahoo's search and display advertising business at $3.84 billion.
•And SunTrust analyst Robert Peck reckons a sale of core Yahoo could net $6 billion to $8 billion in net proceeds.
A consensus on a potential sales price will likely firm up and become more clear if Yahoo moves forward, and as potential bidders decide which parts of core Yahoo are most useful to their particular needs.
02-12-2015, 21:32 #2
02-12-2015, 22:02 #3
Especulação bem limitada (telecommunications and media companies), listando apenas empresas de atuação nacional vs uma empresa global.
Do meu arquivo de maldades:
Naofumi Kagami 加々美直史 @naofumi 12 Dec 2014
@ManyuVsManyu @BenedictEvans Complicated. Should note that for Transit, Weather, News, etc. Yahoo is far, far ahead of Google in Japan.
Japão, para quem não sabe, é a 3a. maior economia do planeta e "impenetrável" para estrangeiros.
Última edição por 5ms; 02-12-2015 às 22:05.
03-12-2015, 18:22 #4
Surprise! Yahoo 'Core' May Actually Be a Good Acquisition
by Don Reisinger
December 3, 2015, 8:00 AM EST
The web portal has a billion users and hundreds of millions of dollars in annual cash flow.
Yahoo has its share of troubles, but as the company’s board considers a possible sale of its core business, it may find a long line of potential suitors.
Yahoo’s board is meeting this week to discuss the possibility of selling its core assets, a source familiar with the matter confirmed to Fortune. While discussions are believed to be in the early stages, the board may ultimately decide to put its core Internet business up for sale including its media properties, e-mail, and advertising.
All that would be left of the company would be its hugely valuable stakes in China-based e-commerce giant Alibaba and Yahoo Japan, a joint venture with Japan-based conglomerate SoftBank, along with some cash. It’s also possible, however, that Yahoo’s board will decide against a sale or may sell just a few pieces of the business.
Speculation about which companies may be interested in Yahoo is rampant. Verizon Communications and Internet company IAC/InterActive Corp are among the potential suitors, according to The Wall Street Journal. Private equity firms are also said to be lining up to bid.
Investors hoping for a deal sent Yahoo’s shares up 5% on Wednesday after news of a possible sale emerged the night before. But others have questioned whether Yahoo is really that valuable.
Critics point to Yahoo’s desire to spin-off its stake in Alibaba, which is valued at around $30 billion, as well as its stake in Yahoo Japan, valued at $8 billion, versus the company’s own market capitalization of nearly $32 billion, as proof that the core of its business is worth nothing. What’s worse, Yahoo shareholders have watched as the company’s revenue has steadily declined and its position in the Internet industry’s pecking order erode.
The truth, however, is that the company’s core Internet business is actually a cash cow that, in the right hands, could be an extremely valuable asset.
“One of the things you get access to is a billion monthly users so that helps you to cross-sell other products,” Bob Peck, an analyst SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, told Fortune in an interview. “You also get access to the advertising technology.”
John Blackledge, head of Internet industry research at Cowen, says Yahoo’s value is in the cash it generates. He estimated that in 2016, alone, Yahoo core would generate $780 million in operating profit. That’s before any buyer cut costs and hires new management. Even after taxes and other expenses, Blackledge says, Yahoo core would generate even more cash than now, like an annuity.
“There’s value in [Yahoo core] that hasn’t been understood or appreciated,” says Scott Kessler, an analyst at S&P Capital IQ. “I’m hardly saying this is a great company with tremendous growth, but this is still a powerful global brand. A lot of companies would be interested in acquiring them.”
For its part, Yahoo declined to comment about any possible sale, and, at least publicly, is committed to focus on growth. The company signed a search ad deal with Google in October, and has recently reported modest growth in its advertising business after years of mostly stagnation. In the third quarter, Yahoo’s revenue rose 7% to $1.2 billion compared to the same period last year. The company’s search and display ad revenue grew 13% and 14%, respectively, and it’s “Mavens” business (Mobile, video, native, and social advertising) saw an increase of 43% year-over-year to $422 million.
While that may not be groundbreaking performance compared with Google and Facebook, it could attract buyers who ultimately want a steady stream of cash.
After all, it’s happened before.
Earlier this year, Verizon said that it would acquire AOL for nearly $4.4 billion. A vestige of the 1990s, AOL was in a similar position as Yahoo. It still had rather impressive ad revenue and substantial cash flow, but its business was slowly shrinking.
Indeed, Kessler says that Verizon could be actively seeking to buy Yahoo buy for all of the same reasons that lured it to AOL. The difference here, is that Yahoo may be even more attractive.
“I don’t see why people should perceive Yahoo to be different than AOL,” he says. “Yahoo is more global, and Yahoo has a stronger balance sheet than AOL did. I think there’s a lot there.”
Questions remain, though, over how much Yahoo’s core business is worth to the right buyer. Analysts surveyed by Fortune value it at anywhere from $1.9 billion and $8 billion. Most analysts, however, say that Yahoo’s core will likely fetch between $5 billion and $8 billion. The wide range is due to the differences in the way analysts value Yahoo’s stake in its Asian investments, and how much cash would remain with what’s left of the company.
Regardless, the sales price would be a far cry from the days of old when Yahoo could have fetched tens of billions more. In 2008, Microsoft proposed a $44.6 billion acquisition, a 62% percent premium to the company’s stock price at the time. That was before Alibaba became such a valuable asset. While the deal would have given Microsoft all of Yahoo, the differences between the Yahoo of 2008 and Yahoo’s core now are not all that different. It would have been one of the biggest technology industry acquisitions in history, and looking back, it would have given shareholders far more cash.
Yahoo ultimately rebuffed Microsoft’s offer and set its own course in hopes of a turnaround. Instead, things got worse.
Now, the board is back in the same spot, mulling a possible sale of Yahoo’s core business. The implications are major. One possibility is that Yahoo would cancel the spin off of its Alibaba shares and keep them. After selling its core Internet assets, Yahoo would essentially become a holding company for its Asian investments.
The process could take months. But as far as Kessler and other analysts Fortune spoke to are concerned, deciding against a sale against may be a grave mistake.
“There are a lot of opportunities and options,” Kessler says of Yahoo. “The time might be ripe.”
05-12-2015, 15:27 #5
The Last Days Of Marissa Mayer?Miguel Helft
This story appears in the December 14, 2015 issue of FORBES.
The late October offsite meeting for more than 120 of Yahoo’s top executives at the Park Central Hotel in San Francisco started well enough. The first day jumped from strategy sessions to upcoming product discussions. But on day two, when the topic shifted to employee engagement, and with CEO Marissa Mayer in and out of the room, things went downhill fast. When Bryan Power, Yahoo’s head of h.r., glossed over results from a recent employee survey that showed dramatic double-digit drops in metrics like morale and trust in the company’s executive leadership, various vice presidents began venting to one another. Those murmurs of discontent erupted into outright heckling when another session—billed as an opportunity to improve communication—turned into a lecture from Yahoo’s top brass that many found patronizing. Vice presidents started calling out their superiors for “not listening,” “not understanding” and “not being interested in changing.” Some cursed.
“It was the most stressful and acrimonious professional meeting I’ve ever attended,” says one participant.
Such is the state of affairs at Yahoo these days. More than three years after Mayer was brought in to turn things around, the original Internet media giant is still failing at its core business and getting whipped not only by Google and Facebook but also by newer entrants such as Instagram, Snapchat and even the beleaguered Twitter. In the most recent quarter its net revenue declined 8% and search revenue, a priority of Mayer’s, declined 13%. Overall traffic has continued to inch downward, and none of its new mobile apps has yielded new users or revenue on the scale Yahoo needs to offset the declines. The stock market has rendered its assessment: Yahoo, which has a market value of $31 billion, owns a $30 billion stake in Alibaba, an $8 billion stake in Yahoo Japan and has $5.5 billion in cash net of debt. While investors often apply discounts to the company’s Asian assets to account for possible taxes and other risks related to their eventual spin off, in many models Yahoo’s core business – with $4 billion in revenue and 10,700 employees – has an implied valuation of less than zero.
Mayer inherited a tough situation. The very idea of an Internet portal—a Yahoo or an AOL—is a relic of a Web era 15 years ago when advertisers were willing to pay dearly for a massive home page audience that could direct millions on to a plethora of services like Mail, News, Sports, Finance, Autos and Search. That model doesn’t compute in the mobile era, where apps and social networks dominate.
But Mayer, a star at Google, was supposed to be smart enough to figure a way out. The knives are now unsheathed. FORBES spoke with more than a dozen current and former executives who requested anonymity to discuss confidential matters, and most say a confused strategy and mismanagement, specifically from Mayer, has undermined any attempts at a turnaround. Yes, she originally brought hope, a badly needed focus on products and a keen understanding of technology. But as pressure to deliver results has mounted, there’s widespread belief, as reflected in that employee survey, that she’s no longer up to the task. The past few months have seen a mass exodus, as Mayer lost her chief accounting officer, chief marketing officer, chief development officer, a string of senior vice presidents and an alarming number of vice presidents from across the company in product, engineering, sales and human resources, with more defections to come. Some former executives FORBES spoke with jumped to gigs they saw as more promising, but several said they left out of exasperation with Mayer. “I am so frustrated and upset that so many people’s hard work is just getting destroyed,” says one recent defector.
Mayer, through a spokeswoman, declined to speak with FORBES for this story. Yahoo declined to comment. At a business conference in San Francisco this month she admitted that there was “more to do” as part of her turnaround but said, “One of the things I’m really proud of is that we have built a future” for Yahoo. Two weeks earlier she told Wall Street analysts during an earnings call that Yahoo has “the right talent, the right strategy and the right assets to deliver long-term *sustainable growth for our investors.” Addressing the defections, she said: “The design and changes in Yahoo’s leadership team are the result of careful planning to achieve the necessary skills, passion and ability to execute growth in our business. Our leadership team today is unequivocally the strongest during my tenure.”
The executives FORBES spoke with dispute that the resignations had much at all to do with “careful planning.” And some increasingly wonder among themselves how long it will be before Mayer joins the ranks of ex-Yahoos.
WHEN, EXACTLY, MAYER’S tenure began heading sideways is difficult to pinpoint. Her hiring in July 2012 was hailed as a coup. Yahoo had just gone through five CEOs in five years, and the last one lied on his *résumé. Mayer was a rock star—the steward of Google’s search engine and spartan home page—an engineer with a *reputation for data-driven decision making and a golden touch with consumers. She was Google’s 20th hire and had spent years in its inner circle. Employees at Yahoo’s Sunnyvale headquarters greeted her with handmade Mayer portraits in the style of Obama’s 2008 “Hope” ads.
Mayer put a focus on mobile, an area Yahoo had badly neglected. She talked of sprucing up Yahoo franchises that were “daily digital habits,” like e-mail, search, finance and sports. Growth, she told Wall Street, would be a “given.” *Talent began joining the company, some of it through a steady stream of acquisitions of small companies, many in mobile business. Mayer also made some bolder bets, most notably the $1.1 billion acquisition of Tumblr in May 2013, a fast-growing blogging and social networking platform. That she was able to complete the deal, when her predecessors had missed out on promising startups like Facebook and Twitter, was itself seen as a victory.
Mayer also made flashy media investments, hiring Katie Couric to be Yahoo’s global anchor in November 2013 and bringing on a string of high-profile journalists to create digital “magazines” focused on tech, health and fashion. She invested in original video series to battle the likes of Netflix and Amazon and sought to claw her way back into the search business, which Yahoo had largely outsourced to Microsoft. With Yahoo’s traditional display ad businesses in decline, Mayer began to define the future of the *company around a handful of areas: mobile, video, native advertising and social, eventually coming up with the acronym “MaVeNS” to encapsulate her efforts. Plenty of Yahoos, especially those whose projects thrived, became Mayer fans. “She’s the best leader we’ve had,” says Marco Wirasinghe, who was at Yahoo from 2010 to this summer and led the development of Yahoo Weather, an app Mayer frequently lauds as a notable hit.
05-12-2015, 15:28 #6
Not everyone saw it that way. Some of her most senior executives say the data-driven approach she honed at Google seemed to give way to snap judgments. Early in her tenure she demanded that a landing page ad on Yahoo Mail be removed simply because she didn’t like the user experience. Executives pushed back, noting the ad brought in roughly $70 million annually, to no avail. “She knew she didn’t like it, but there was no thinking about the impact,” says a former executive. Similarly, Mayer insisted on introducing a new ad product during a keynote speech at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas in January 2014. The team responsible for the product, Yahoo Ad Manager, insisted it wasn’t ready, but it was pushed on a small set of advertisers with disastrous results: Only about two in ten campaigns outperformed an earlier system, and Yahoo had to pull the product while the team fixed it.
Mayer hired some executives without fully vetting them with her team, and some of those decisions proved costly. One of her first big hires was Google sales executive Henrique De Castro, brought on as chief operating officer. De Castro failed to meet sales goals and Mayer fired him after 15 months, but not before he reportedly pocketed as much as $109 million in compensation and severance. Mayer also spent a year without a chief information officer after her IT operations chief David Dibble quit for personal reasons in 2013. In August 2014 Mayer finally announced to her executive staff that she had found the right person in Netflix executive Mike Kail, who came recommended by her husband, the investor Zachary Bogue. Three months later Netflix sued Kail for fraud, after he allegedly collected kickbacks from vendors. Yahoo *quietly let him go in May.
Mayer’s propensity for micromanaging also exasperated many of her executives. By her own admission, Mayer spent an entire weekend working with a team of designers to revamp the Yahoo corporate logo, debating such details as the right slant for the exclamation point (9 degrees from vertical). Mayer also insisted on personally reviewing even minor deviations from a compensation policy she had instituted. When managers wanted to give top performers a bonus or raise above the parameters she had set, they had to write her an e-mail explaining the circumstances and wait for an approval or denial. Some managers dispute that this was a hard-and-fast rule. Mayer also insisted on reviewing the terms given to hundreds of contractors and vendors on a quarterly basis, whether they were engineers or writers or makeup artists. “She would go line by line and decide on what date a contract should end,” says a senior executive. Adds another: “It was a colossal waste of time.”
But perhaps none of these incidents damaged morale more than Mayer’s reorganization of Yahoo’s product teams. When Mayer launched the effort last fall, everyone agreed the existing structure had outlived its usefulness—for instance, mobile products was partitioned from other groups. But Mayer embarked on the process without laying out a grand vision for it. Instead, she began sketching out different scenarios in one-on-one meetings with various executives, floating one plan by one exec and a different by another. Unable to make up her mind, the process dragged on for months. “She went through 20 different permutations,” says an executive with knowledge of the process. “The product guys were twisting in the wind, not knowing what they were going to run.”
Product releases slowed to a trickle, and a turf war brewed as executives became concerned with their futures. Jon McCormack, a star executive who had joined Yahoo in January from Amazon and was promised a broad engineering portfolio covering critical areas like mobile, landed in the vacuum created by Mayer’s indecision. He was gone by the end of February and now works for Google. When Mayer announced the new structure in April, it was too late. “That was the beginning of everyone losing faith,” says another senior executive. “That’s when people started to look for other jobs.”
FASHION BLOGS and society pages always go crazy for the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s Costume Institute Benefit, New York’s most exclusive and chic event. This May, somewhere between the entrances of Lady Gaga and George Clooney, there was Mayer, strolling the red carpet in a scarlet Oscar de la Renta beaded gown. Mayer was *cochair of the event, along with Wendi Murdoch, actresses Jennifer Lawrence and Gong Li and Vogue editor Anna Wintour.
Yahoo paid close to $3 million for the privilege—$2.5 million for the sponsorship and the rest for ancillary events. Besides the celebrity press photos and mentions of Mayer in her dress, Yahoo didn’t have much to show for its money. Its name was mentioned on the program, but its iconic corporate logo was nowhere to be found. Yahoo ad sales executives hoped to invite their best clients to sit at one of their two tables, but Mayer instead filled them with a few employees and a larger group of friends.
Yahoo Styles, the one property that could have materially benefited from Yahoo’s largesse at the gala, saw a drop in audience that month, and its overall traffic is down 54% in the U.S. in the past year, according to comScore.
That sad formula—expenditures without offsetting results—abounds. Despite millions spent on acquisitions to build a first-class mobile development team, the only Yahoo app in Apple’s top 100 is Yahoo Mail, at No. 84 in mid November. (Tumblr hovers around 100th place.)
Yahoo’s media investments have fallen short, too. Traffic to Yahoo Screen, which includes many of its video initiatives, is down 50% in the last year, according to comScore, and Yahoo is taking a $42 million writedown on video investments like Community, an original video series, because, in the words of chief financial officer Ken Goldman, “We couldn’t see a way to make money over time.” Yahoo Beauty and Yahoo Health are down 33% and 11%, respectively. The one Yahoo property that is up significantly is Tumblr, whose usage rose 56% in the U.S. in the last year. Yahoo has said that Tumblr will be a $100 million business this year. Yet Facebook-owned Instagram, whose global audience is comparable in size to Tumblr’s, is expected to bring in nearly $600 million, according to eMarketer. While Mayer likes to trumpet the rapid growth of her “MaVeNS” (mobile, video, native advertising and social) to $420 million in the most recent quarter, that growth has not been enough to prevent Yahoo from contracting. Mayer’s original turnaround strategy was to be built on “people, products, traffic, revenue,” in that order. She initially brought some good people, but hasn’t delivered on products, traffic or revenue. And now, the people are fleeing.
Wall Street has largely ignored the tumult and the disappointing results for a simple reason: None of it matters to investors—for now. Yahoo shares have been little more than a tracking stock of Alibaba, the Chinese Internet giant it acquired a big stake in years ago. Once the often delayed *spinoff of the Alibaba shares goes through—it is expected to do so by January—Yahoo’s core business will come into sharp relief. Mayer has said she plans to “narrow our strategy and focus on fewer products,” and has hired McKinsey to go through what some executives believe could be a cut of 2,000 or more jobs. Speculation that a private equity buyer could sweep up what’s left is rampant.
Plenty of Yahoos still say they “bleed purple”—a shorthand for their loyalty to and love for the company. They bemoan its descent into irrelevancy with sadness and insist that lots of talent and valuable assets remain. One product expected to survive Mayer’s knife is Index, a mobile search service and platform comparable to digital assistants like Google Now and Microsoft’s Cortana. The product is months late, according to insiders, and Yahoo employees are divided on whether it has a shot at competing with rivals. Investors are skeptical. Today Yahoo accounts for only about 12.7% of searches in the United States, down from about 13% when Mayer took over. Even insiders say virtually no one deliberately seeks Yahoo search when they decide to look for something. “She says she’s going to change how people are going to search on mobile,” says Ben Schachter, an analyst with Macquarie Group. “My answer is, ‘Good luck.’ ”
Things have become so dire that some insiders are speculating that Mayer will throw in the towel and look for a graceful exit—perhaps using the birth of her twins, expected around the New Year, as a reason to step down. Others say that’s nonsense and that Mayer will continue to fight, as long as the board keeps her on the job.
The outcome of Mayer’s turnaround efforts, if not her chosen path or methods, may have been inevitable. About a year into Mayer’s tenure a group of a dozen or so executives from Yahoo’s glory days gathered for a private dinner at a Silicon Valley mansion. There was lots of reminiscing and, as the wine flowed, the topic of Mayer inevitably came up. She was a good hire, perhaps a great one, many agreed. But would she succeed? Not one of the executives thought so — and not one could articulate a plan to make Yahoo grow again.
Miguel Helft is the San Francisco Bureau Chief for Forbes. Follow him on Twitter at @mhelft
05-12-2015, 15:36 #7
Marissa Mayer: A Case Study In Poor Leadership
Not every talented, successful executive is CEO ready
Mayer is a textbook example of this. It was obvious from the early days, at least to those paying attention, that Mayer didn’t have the leadership chops to pull off the admittedly tough assignment of turning around the once iconic Yahoo brand. A question worth asking is, why didn’t the Yahoo board of directors recognize this?
Just this week, Miguel Helft authored a meaty article chronicling Mayer’s tenure at Yahoo. Helft was fair in his analysis, pointing out that anyone who assumed the helm at Yahoo had an almost impossible task in front of them. Breathing life back into a company whose business model was built for an era that has long since passed is no easy task. That said, Helft was also fair in highlighting Mayer’s dismal track record of making questionable, if not altogether poor decisions at virtually every turn.
There’s much that can be learned about leadership in any real world case study, and the Mayer/Yahoo saga is no exception. Just about any company can be reinvented and reinvigorated with sound leadership – the obvious missing ingredient for Mayer and for the Yahoo board. If there’s a silver lining here, it is this: it’s never too late to lead better. While that certainly applies to Mayer, my belief is that it also applies to the Yahoo board. Both Mayer and the board are culpable of poor leadership.
Much of my personal practice deals with CEO succession, and the misadventures of Mayer represents the classic case of picking the wrong CEO, and then compounding the error with a poor transition into the role. From day one, Mayer could have talked less and listened more. She could have taken the time to learn before acting (solutions that precede understanding usually don’t end well). She could have mended fences rather than building walls. She chose to pontificate, posture and spin rather than listen, learn and understand. One of the first things a newly seated chief executive needs to tackle is building trust across all constituencies, but particularly with the workforce. There’s an old Roman saying, “He who control the army wins” – Mayer lost this battle in the early days.
Culture is often talked about but rarely understood. It’s the glue that holds all businesses together. By all accounts, culture at Yahoo is broken, if not altogether toxic under Mayer’s stewardship. I’ve always said that a toxic culture is code for failed leadership. What Mayer has failed to grasp is that you cannot transform a culture you do not understand. A corporate culture is a fragile ecosystem with many interdependent mechanisms that must be nurtured in order to thrive. A strong culture is a performance accelerant capable of creating huge shifts in momentum. Mayer has completely missed the biggest lever a CEO has to pull – culture.
05-12-2015, 15:39 #8
Lembrando que “Core Yahoo remains the fifth-largest website in the world" (Alexa Traffic Rank)
(sétimo no Brasil)
Última edição por 5ms; 05-12-2015 às 15:46.
05-12-2015, 16:23 #9
Marissa Mayer: A Case Study In Poor Leadership (continuação)
The most profound and commonly overlooked aspect of learning is recognizing the necessity of unlearning
Mayer’s leadership seems to be more about Mayer than those she is responsible for leading. I don’t begrudge anyone a fair wage, but as the highest paid female CEO at $42.1 million dollars, it’s fair to question whether Mayer is worth the investment. Mayer would be well served to take the spotlight off herself, and shine it on those she leads. If you dismiss the opinions of your team, don’t be shocked when they stop sharing their insights. If the people you lead are afraid to make mistakes you‘ ll never see their best work. And if you consistently tell people they’re not leaders, don’t be surprised when they start to believe you. Another leadership miss for Mayer – but for the people there is no platform.
Another completely unavoidable mistake was not having a cohesive, crisply articulated strategy. Mayer has attempted to ideate her way to the future by implementing any number of disparate initiatives that felt like a series of one-off imposed mandates. What she should have done was build alignment around a well conceived, collaborative effort based upon an a clear vision for the future. She has experienced only tepid buy-in on her vision, and her execution has been flawed as a result. Setting expectations is gamesmanship – aligning them is leadership.
Perhaps Mayer’s biggest failure is the ability to unlearn. Many leaders are very skilled at challenging the thoughts and opinions of others, but are woefully inept when it comes to challenging their own thinking. The reality is that it takes no effort to cling to your current thinking; however to change your mind requires you to challenge your mind. I’ve believed for quite sometime the most profound and commonly overlooked aspect of learning is recognizing the necessity of unlearning.
Mayer consistently rebuffs dissenting and/differing opinions and exhibits a close-mindedness that rarely serves a leader well. She has had trouble understanding there’s a big difference between standing on conviction versus just wanting to win an argument. When evaluating a position on any given topic, smart leaders must ask themselves, are they trying to learn something, or are they just trying to justify their opinion? Having strong convictions is a healthy thing so long as you’re convicted by the truth and not your pride or your ego.
Being a CEO is tough, and no doubt, being a CEO leading a major business transformation is even tougher. I actually don’t fault Mayer for the Yahoo debacle as much as I do the Yahoo board for not recognizing what type of leader they needed for this assignment. That said, without an Alibaba miracle, or a massive change in leadership Yahoo is simply going to die a very slow and painful death.
Mike Myatt, leadership advisor to Fortune 500 CEOs and Boards, Author of Hacking Leadership (Wiley), and Chairman of N2Growth
08-12-2015, 19:09 #10
Verizon vs YahooO diretor financeiro da Verizon, Fran Shammo, disse que a maior operadora de redes sem fio dos Estados Unidos pode analisar a compra do negócio principal do Yahoo!, que inclui email, sites de notícias e esportes e a tecnologia para anúncios.
— Se acharmos que há um encaixe estratégico, que faz sentido para nossos acionistas e que podemos obter retorno, eu acho que podemos olhar, mas neste ponto é ainda muito prematuro falar sobre esse assunto — disse o diretor financeiro Shammo.
Shammo estava falando na conferência anual de comunicações e mídia global do UBS em Nova York, nesta segunda-feira. Também neste ano, a Verizon comprou a AOL num acordo de US$ 4,4 bilhões para entrar no negócio de vídeos móveis e anúncios dirigidos.
— É muito parecido com a AOL, quero dizer que analisados tudo dentro desse espectro — disse Shammo. — Tudo o que posso dizer é que não sei o que o conselho do Yahoo! vai decidir. É muito cedo para saber.